Despite its unprecedented nature, Greenland Minister Vivian Motzfeldt’s visit to France in May 2025 went almost unnoticed. French polar policy expert Arthur Amelot explains this discreet diplomatic gesture. Yet it is rich in symbolism, and could mark the beginning of a strategic rapprochement between Paris and Nuuk, at a time when Greenland is establishing itself as a central player in the Arctic. Tribune.
It was a historic visit, but one that caused little stir.
For the first time, in mid-May 2025, France received a political representative from Greenland, in the person of Vivian Motzfeldt, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Research of this autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. Although unofficial, does this unprecedented diplomatic gesture open a new page in relations between Paris and Nuuk, the capital of Greenland? Curiously, despite the international attention focused on the Arctic island at the beginning of 2025, following President Donald Trump’s remarks about its possible annexation, if necessary by force, no French media outlet really reported on it.
How is it that such an event, at the crossroads of geopolitical changes in the Arctic and Greenland’s growing ambitions on the international stage, has remained so confidential?
In fact, this absence speaks volumes about France’s still hazy perception of Greenland’s place in international relations; it also reveals the relative lack of attention in France to a region that is central to the ecological, energy and strategic challenges facing the Arctic region.
This visit, which is arguably the inaugural one, is largely ignored, but has a great deal of meaning. It reveals a Franco-Greenlandic relationship that deserves to be reread in the light of history.
Imagination as a starting point
Until recently, Greenland rarely evoked anything other than a distant landscape of ice and silence, home to the Inuit natives and heavy polar bears. Distant both in geography and in the mind, this space had become anchored in the collective imagination as a southern margin of the world. This northern projection, at once Hyperborea and Ultima Thule, gradually materialized through the accounts of explorers such as Isaac de La Peyrère, or the great names that remain, even today, Jean-Baptiste Charcot, Paul-Emile Victor or Jean Malaurie.
But this imaginary world seems to continue to obscure Greenland’s political dimension. Behind the ice and the myths, the territory is undergoing a profound transformation, fully aware of its national interests, its vast natural resources, and its growing strategic role in regional and global balances.
Today, Greenland is asserting a voice of its own (through the slogan “Nothing about us without us”), which it is seeking to make heard on the international stage, thus defining its foreign relations, particularly with countries like France.
The Greenlandic minister’s visit embodies this new reality. Notably, her exchanges, the visible ones, took place with Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, around scientific and economic cooperation, as well as with Higher Education and Research Minister Philippe Baptiste, to whom she presented the conditions to be respected for research in Greenland – at least, according to the LinkedIn publication that remains. Both dialogues, it is clear, had science at their core.
Science as a key vector for cooperation
On the strength of France’s historic commitment to polar exploration, where science and discovery come together to decipher the dynamics of these spaces, the country has a solid foundation on which to deepen its relationship with Greenland.
Science is thus a privileged vector for cooperation, particularly in a context where ecological and geopolitical issues intersect. A host of French institutions play a key role in this scientific diplomacy: the Institut Polaire Français Paul-Emile Victor (IPEV), a key player in scientific campaigns in the polar regions, regularly supports scientific projects based in Greenland; the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); universities and political schools; the Institut Français de Recherche pour l’Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER); and associations such as the Comité National Français des Recherches Arctiques et Antarctiques (CNFRAA), through its Journées Scientifiques, and the Greenlandia initiative.
In this context, Greenland, which has held the presidency of the Arctic Council since May 2025, alongside the Faroe Islands and Denmark, embodies a new Arctic centrality focused on research, sustainable economic development and Arctic populations. This intergovernmental forum, largely focused on the development of regional scientific knowledge, is becoming a diplomatic space where France, as an observer state, can enhance its expertise and strengthen its ties with Nuuk.
However, the research dynamic is not without its tensions. On the Greenlandic side, these scientific approaches, although now subject to regulation, can be perceived as an imposition of external frameworks of thought, a colonial legacy detached from indigenous knowledge models and local needs. This dichotomy – Western science vs. traditional knowledge – fuels criticism and expectations, particularly with regard to respect for cultural sovereignty and territory.
A symbolic turning point in French involvement in Greenland’s future came when the island left the European Communities in 1985, after a largely unwanted entry through Denmark.
While the Greenlanders asserted their desire for self-determination through their first autonomy in 1979, France – via the EU – remained indirectly involved, illustrating an initial transition to broader geopolitical issues.
France’s first interference in Greenland’s future: the island’s exit from the European Communities
In 1982, Greenlanders voted in a referendum to leave the European Communities. This result triggered an unprecedented legal procedure: the modification of the three Community treaties (European Economic Community, European Coal and Steel Community and European Atomic Energy Community) had to be ratified by all member states.
The task was pressing: the Treaty amending the Treaties establishing the European Communities with regard to Greenland, signed in March 1984, was due to enter into force on January 1, 1985. France, then President of the Council of the European Communities in the second half of 1984, played a central institutional role in coordinating and bringing to a successful conclusion the ongoing process.
The French ratification process was marked by a disagreement between the two chambers of Parliament, which was unprecedented at the time in terms of international regulations. The National Assembly, with its left-wing majority, voted in favor of the amendment authorizing Greenland’s exit, in the name of respect for the right of peoples to self-determination(1st reading)(2nd reading).
The Senate, with its right-wing majority, was opposed, citing the risk of setting a legal precedent within the European Union, and at a time when France was facing strong tensions in New Caledonia, citing economic, security and even territorial consequences(1st reading)(2nd reading). Failing agreement in the joint committee, the National Assembly had the last word in December 1984, in accordance with article 45, paragraph 4 of the French Constitution.
As the parliamentary archives show (see above), the Senate majority, supported by right-wing deputies, already raised thematic arguments on this occasion that would, over time, contribute to redefining the perception of Greenland in public debate: from a peripheral space, it was gradually transformed into a strategic territory, rich in resources and endowed with a growing military potential.
When the Arctic becomes a security and economic issue
Greenland’s strategic shift began in the mid-20th century, when the island, still a Danish colony, became a military crossing point between North America and Eurasia. Since then, France has strengthened its presence on the island through multinational exercises such as ARGUS.
However, despite this episodic military presence, all defense cooperation remains under Danish sovereignty. The Greenland Self-Government Act of 2009, while extending Nuuk’s competences in many areas, maintains defense under Danish control, even though Greenland is increasingly involved in security discussions.
Added to these security issues is France’s growing interest in Greenland’s economic potential, particularly in the field of renewable energies. While the island is best known for its resources of critical minerals, uranium (despite a ban on mining since 2021), precious stones and fresh water, it also boasts strong hydroelectric potential that has yet to be fully exploited.
Aware of these opportunities, Greenland recently invited France to consider investments in its territory, underlining the desire to develop a stronger economic partnership. This dynamic took concrete form in 2024, at a business conference in Nuuk, where a senior EDF executive was able to testify to the interest of French players in Greenland’s energy sector.
Supported by a European partnership focused in particular on green growth, this investment potential offers France a strategic opportunity to play a long-term role in the economic and energy development of this key Arctic region.
From margin to dialogue: towards a convergence of interests despite statutory asymmetry?
Long confined to the margins of the French geopolitical imagination, Greenland is beginning to establish itself as a strategic partner in its own right. Vivian Motzfedt’s visit may have gone unnoticed, but it crystallized a turning point in Franco-Greenlandic relations: that of a nascent dialogue, still discreet but carrying major stakes. Scientific research, climate, defense, resources: interests are increasingly converging between a France committed to redefining its polar policy, and a Greenland eager to broaden its partners.
But this convergence is still marked by statutory asymmetry and institutional caution: Nuuk’s asserted autonomy still seems to be matched by relative French hesitancy, both diplomatically and strategically. From apparent chronic interests to a truly structured partnership, it’s up to France to review its position.
Arthur Amelot is an expert and consultant to the European Commission, a Junior Fellow at the NATO Defense College, and a member of the Board of Directors of APECS France. He is interested in diplomatic relations between France, Europe and the polar regions.