Suspicious manoeuvres over Svalbard’s undersea cables

by Heiner Kubny
09/17/2026

A Russian fishing trawler in the harbour of Båtsfjord in northern Norway. Russian fishing vessels are still permitted to operate in certain Norwegian waters. Several trawlers have recently been repeatedly spotted over the routes of the undersea cables between the Norwegian mainland and Svalbard. (Photo: Joachim Kohler / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0)

Several Russian fishing vessels have repeatedly crossed the routes of the undersea cables between the Norwegian mainland and Svalbard in recent days. These voyages are legal and do not constitute evidence of sabotage. However, in light of previous cable damage, their movements are being closely monitored.

As High North News reported in early September 2026, citing AIS data, several Russian trawlers have been repeatedly detected crossing the routes of the Svalbard Undersea Cable System. The two fibre-optic cables connect Svalbard with the Norwegian mainland and are of vital importance for communications in the archipelago.

The Svalbard Undersea Cable System (SUCS) connects Longyearbyen on Svalbard to the Norwegian mainland via two fibre-optic cables. The map also shows the planned Arctic Way connection, which is to run via the island of Jan Mayen, situated further to the west. The undersea cables form a vital communications link for the archipelago. (Graphic: PolarJournal)

The vessels were operating in waters where Russian fishing is permitted. Furthermore, repeated crossings of a cable route are not unusual for trawlers, as they frequently traverse the same areas multiple times whilst trawling. There is as yet no evidence to suggest that the vessels were deliberately monitoring or seeking to damage the cables.

These vessel movements have attracted attention primarily due to an incident in January 2022. At that time, one of the two Svalbard cables was damaged. Investigators assumed human intervention was involved. AIS data showed that the Russian trawler Melkart 5 had previously passed over the affected area on several occasions. However, no evidence of deliberate action could be established.

The current observations thus highlight a fundamental problem: critical underwater infrastructure and regular fishing operations sometimes utilise the same marine areas in the Arctic. As a result, even legal vessel movements can quickly attract attention from security policy makers.

Heiner Kubny, PolarJournal